Plotinus' Orientalism

angelegt 31.06.2021

PLOTINUS’ ORIENTALISM

According to Wolters (1982), the theory of an Oriental source for Plotinus’ thought, especially concerning the One, can be traced back to the work of Bréhier. Wolters specifically has in mind Bréhier’s argument, made in his The Philosophy of Plotinus, that, “we find at the very center of Plotinus’ thought a foreign element which defies classification. The theory of Intelligence as universal being derives neither from Greek rationalism nor from the piety diffused through the religious circles of his day” (Bréhier 1958: 116). It is not necessary here to trace the further reception of this thesis in Neoplatonic studies, except to note that what is at stake in the debate is not the possibility of Hellenistic, Alexandrine or Jewish influence upon Plotinus, but, specifically, Indian philosophy as a source of influence on Plotinus (see Gregorios 2002).

As Gregorios notes, the problem of Plotinus’ “Orientalism” is not the problem of Plotinus’ Oriental sources, which are, in any case, not in doubt among scholars,⁴⁷ but the question of whether there is a specifically foreign element in Plotinus’ thought, and that means, an element alien to the spirit of Greek rationality (or, at least, to that spirit as it was understood in nineteenth-century philosophy). Here is where an engagement with Bréhier’s thesis might profitably begin. Specifically, we shall ask how Indian philosophy was understood by Bréhier such that it could appear as the counter-concept to Greek rationality.⁴⁸ Further, we shall ask what it reveals about our own philosophical prejudices that Plotinus’ thought of the One could appear inconsistent with his systematic philosophy and why, when it comes to the choice between these two, we are quicker to surrender the former (seeking a foreign origin for it) than the latter.

Concerning Plotinus’ thought of the One, Bréhier argues that “the source of the philosophy of Plotinus” must be placed “beyond the Orient close to Greece, in the religious speculation of India, which by the time of Plotinus had been founded for centuries on the Upanishads and had retained their vitality” (Bréhier 1958: 117). At the outset, he rejects Greek and Near Eastern philosophy as the source of this thought, as he considers it incompatible with Plotinus’ systematic philosophy (identified with the hypostases of the Soul and Intelligence). Thus he speaks of a “double aspect” to “Plotinus’ notion of Intelligence”, comprising “an articulated system of definition notions” and a “universal being in [which] ... every difference is absorbed”. Whereas the former is conducive to “a knowledge of the world and [holds] that reality can be grasped through reason”, the latter seeks only “the mystical ideal of the complete unification of beings in the Godhead” (ibid.: 106). The former is the product of “Plotinus’ exegesis of ... Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics” (ibid.). The origins of the latter, on contrast, lie in “new mental habits, born of religious beliefs the origin of which is in the Orient, outside of Hellenism” (ibid.: 107).

Bréhier develops the contrast between these two systems along three lines: (1) concerning the way Plotinus addresses the problem of the constitution of individual consciousness, (2) concerning the relation of the individual soul to the One, and (3) the way Plotinus conceives of the universal character of Soul.

Concerning the first, Bréhier argues that “the Plotinian concept of the relation of the individual to the universal being” is “quite different” (from the Greek concept). “It is no longer a rational unity which he is seeking but a mystical unification in which individual consciousness is to disappear” (ibid.: 110). This has both epistemological and ethical consequences. Epistemologically, we are no longer dealing with “a rational knowledge but [only] with an experience”. “The ‘true knowledge’ of which Plotinus speaks ... is only an immediate intuition of beings” (ibid.). Ethically, the Plotinian ideal of ecstatic union with the One “differs in principle from all the philosophical systems and religions of his time because of the almost complete absence of the idea of a mediator or savior destined to bring man into relation with God .... The very idea of salvation, which implies a mediatory sent by God to man, is foreign to him” (ibid.: 112).

Concerning the second, Bréhier argues that Plotinus, “in piling up contrasts between the reality accessible to Intelligence and the boundless reality in which ecstatic love loses itself”, ultimately ends up “sever[ing] every bond which connected the first with the second” (ibid.: 156). The result is a hypertrophied intellectualism in which (according to Bréhier) no bridge is possible between the rationalism of the Plotinian system and its suprarational mysticism (ibid.: 148). Indeed, Bréhier argues that Plotinus, by premising his entire system upon the principle of the One, jeopardizes his entire systematic project (ibid.: 154).

Finally, concerning the third, Bréhier argues that Plotinus’ understanding of Soul defies rational explanation. All difference being “absorbed” in “universal being”, the “distinction between subject and object [too] comes to an end”. In place of an “articulated system of definite notions”, a “knowledge of the world”, we find only the “mystical ideal of the complete unification of beings in the Godhead” (ibid.: 106). Thus, through a kind of hypertrophied intellectualism, Plotinus’ ultimately goes over into its very antithesis: mere intuition and mere feeling of oneness with the totality of beings. “Intellectualism”, says Bréhier poignantly, “has destroyed itself through its own exaggeration” (ibid.: 103).

The contrast between rationalism and irrationalism is absolute as Bréhier understands it (ibid.: 158; cf. also 156). Further, by destroying the notion of difference, irrationalism simultaneously makes ethics impossible. “Knowledge of the self possesses no ethical character in [Indian] philosophy” (ibid.: 128). It impinges the relation of the individual to the supraindividual reality. Although a “subject of knowledge”, the self in this conception “nevertheless experiences nothing pertaining to the life of a moral person”. Hence, the relation of this person to God cannot be “the trusting attitude of the faithful believer”. “The ascetic is merely endeavoring to remove every veil that separates him from Brahman” (ibid.: 128–9). Irrationalism replaces (the desire for) knowledge with “an obscure emotion, a vital feeling without form, [or] an intangible Stimmung”. “Real knowledge consists then not in classifying forms and in grasping their relations, but, on the contrary, in going beyond every finite form.” Thus Bréhier argues brahman (and mutatis mutandis the Plotinian One) is “not an object of knowledge”. Even if knowledge of a certain kind is necessary to attain it, “this knowledge has nothing to with understanding and erudition”: “Knowledge of the Veda is required to lead to it. Meditation and ascetic practices are required. The identity of the self with the universal being is not a rational conclusion reached by the intellect, but a sort of intuition due to the practice of meditation” (ibid.: 125).

The philosophical system motivated by a yearning for unity is “opposed to the Hellenic and Judeo-Christian ideal.” “In opposition to Greek philosophy,” it implies “no attempt at a rational explanation of things”. The connection between (the desire for) rational explanation and creation is very strong as Bréhier sees it. He argues that in the philosophical speculations of the Indian,

what corresponds to rational explanation is at best a theory of emanation, which Oldenberg points out as a tendency in the philosophy of the Upanishads. Things will be only the unfolding and expansion of forces that are united in the universal being. This dynamism, the notion of the development of one and the same life, is very far from the rational order of forms sought by the Greek philosopher. (Ibid.: 128)

Finally, in its insistence on the identity of the individual and the whole, mysticism destroys the possibility of (rational) religion. Not only is “the very idea of salvation, which implies a mediator sent by God to man” (ibid.: 112) “foreign” to Plotinus, but “piety, in the usual sense of the word”, is also “absent in him” (ibid.: 113).

Mysticism, understood as the longing for union with the One or for a trans-personal experience of the One, thus leads step-by-step away from the goals of rational (Greek) philosophy. It is in this sense that it introduces an “Oriental” element into Plotinus’ thinking. Bréhier sees this longing as paradigmatically embodied in the philosophical speculation of the Upanisads: “The common and rather monotonous theme of all the Upanishads is that of a knowledge which assures the one possessing it peace and unfailing happiness. This knowledge is the consciousness of the identity of the self with the universal being” (ibid.: 123). Hence, if we detect an Oriental element (in the first sense) in Plotinus’ thought, it must follow that there is an Oriental element (in the second sense) in his thought. The question of Plotinus’ Orientalism thus becomes the question of the irrationalism of Indian philosophy.